David Bell Mislan's Enemies of the American Way attempts to approach the problem of def ining international threats through two contrasting methods: by attempting to f it it within a number of theoretical f rameworks, and by studying three presidents f rom over a century ago.
Grover Cleveland was the only President to serve two non-consecutive terms. He broke a long Republican stranglehold on the White House in 1884 to become the f irst elected Democrat since Buchanan bef ore the Civil War. He then lost his bid f or a second term to Republican Benjamin Harrison, whose grandf ather, William, had also been President, though only f or a month. Harrison, in turn, lost his bid f or re-election to a resurgent Grover Cleveland, who went on to serve a f ull second term. In 1896, William McKinley reclaimed the White House f or the Republicans, winning again in 1900, both times at the expense of the populist agrarian Democrat William Jennings Bryan. McKinley, however, was assassinated in September 1901, just six months into his second term. (Not, as Mislan states, in February, bef ore it even started). It is at this stage that the period embraced by the book ends, leaving the colourf ul T heodore Roosevelt years still ahead.
Mislan has two approaches. First he gives us an occasionally slightly laboured identif ication of theoretical f rameworks. First there is balance of threat theory (of f ensive capability/of f ensive intentions, etc.). T hen domestic politics and sectional interests (House and Senate/perceived "national interest", etc.). Social Identity theory (individual identif ication with membership of social groups is then applied. But f inally, RuleBased Identity comes to the rescue, and provides a template that satisf ies Mislan. T he answer, it turns out, is "identity salience", or ""the def inition of the self in terms of group membership shared with other people".
T his means that Rule-Based Identity is more likely to mean that Americans regard themselves not so much as "Americans" as, f or instance, "baseball-playing Americans". "What matters f or the survival of group identity, and the identif ication of threat, depends on how a group identif ies itself ."
Which is all very interesting, but where do Presidents Cleveland, Harrison and McKinley come in? You never thought you'd be so pleased to welcome back these three long-dead leaders; but, af ter the theory, it's a positive pleasure to get down to brass tacks with them.
Cleveland's threats were the British, the Germans and the Spanish: but always by proxy. T here was never any question of the USA f acing a head-on conf lict with them. It was all vicarious: Britain over Canada and then over Venezuela; Germany over Samoa; and, notoriously, Spain over Cuba. T his last, of course, the occasion of Hearst's f amous dictum to the ef f ect that his staf f must f urnish the pictures: he'd f urnish the war! For Cleveland, Mislan argues, Americans were rugged individualists, humble, f aithf ul, hard-working and, above all, just. It was all the f ault of other international rascals who had not the same high standards: Cleveland was otherwise happy to let sleeping dogs lie.
Harrison was also an essentially peaceable President. However, he too had his standards, and his sense of high national self -esteem made it hard f or him to put up with perf idious Albion's past support of the Conf ederates in the Civil War. (T he support was not, of course, unanimous, but it was extensive, and across parties). Ironically, Harrison, who admired much of Britain's political culture, regarded the quintessential late-Victorian Prime Minister Lord Salisbury as one of the most predatory f igures on the world stage.
Harrison's Americans were exceptional because of their unique polity and system of government. America's history, self -determination and civic-mindedness made the country and its people inherently superior. So, f or Harrison, the attempt to take over Hawaii was not out of a sense of aggression or expansionism: it was simply his knowledge that they would be so much better of f ; and they would be protected f rom the terrible prospect of rule by Germany, France, Britain or Italy -between whom he scarcely distinguished.
For McKinley, Harrison's f ellow-Republican, the perception was similar: but, because he lived in slightly more turbulent times, he was enraged by the contrast between America's humanity and the inhumanity of the rest. T hat, essentially, was the reason f or the intervention against the Spanish in Cuba in the 1890s. Unlike Harrison, McKinley never saw the British as a real threat, and studiously avoided taking a high moral tone over the Boer War. He was happy to counter what he saw as German aggression over the Philippines and Spanish action in Cuba. However, there were no permanent threats and enemies: just individual responses on merit.
Enemies of the American Way is at its best in dealing with specif ic historical events. When Mislan returns to his theoretical f rameworks and applies them to directly to the events of these "Gilded Age" presidencies, the ef f ect can f eel laboured: the results either already apparent f rom what has been recounted, or resting on too little data f or them to have any more general applicability. However, he has done a service in reminding us how important individual presidents' own preconceptions and mindsets were then and still are now in shaping global f oreign policy. 
